Intent Declared Summary
In 2008, the Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) – which conducts Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style self and mutual evaluations on the efficacy and progress of domestic measures of member countries – released the findings of the mutual evaluation they conducted on Nigeria's Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) regime against the FATF’s 40+9 recommendations. According to the findings of this report, Nigeria largely complies with 7, partially complies with 20 and does not comply with 20 FATF recommendations and special recommendations. Nigeria has been making efforts to strengthen its AML framework since it appeared on the list of non-cooperative countries and territories (NCCT) in 2001. As a consequence, Nigeria’s name was taken off the list in June 2006. Despite these efforts numerous flaws still persist. Most significantly, the 2008 GIABA mutual evaluation report notes that terrorism and terrorist financing have not been sufficiently criminalized under the legal framework. Furthermore, Nigerian authorities have not issued clear guidance to financial institutions resulting in weak customer due diligence (CDD), record keeping, and suspicious transaction reporting requirements. However, a bill on terrorism prevention is currently before the National Assembly. The GIABA mutual evaluation notes that the bill is comprehensive and has incorporated all the measures in UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373. A 2009 Update by GIABA on Nigeria's progress since the 2008 mutual evaluation concludes that Nigeria has made significant efforts to address the shortcomings observed by the assessors and that the Nigerian authorities are determined to address all other concerns raised by the 2008 mutual evaluation in order to build a robust AML/CFT regime in the country. Moreover, the FATF's 2008-2009 Annual Report names Nigeria as one of the jurisdictions that have undertaken to implement the FATF's 40+9 recommendations.
General Overview
In 2008, the Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) – which conducts FATF-style self and mutual evaluations on the efficacy and progress of domestic measures of member countries – released the findings of the mutual evaluation they conducted on Nigeria's AML and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) regime against the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40 recommendations and 9 special recommendations. According to the findings of this report, Nigeria largely complies with 7, partially complies with 20 and does not comply with 20 FATF recommendations and special recommendations. Although Nigeria has been making efforts to strengthen its AML framework numerous flaws still persist. Most significantly, the 2008 GIABA mutual evaluation report notes that terrorism and terrorist financing have not been sufficiently criminalized under the legal framework. Furthermore, Nigerian authorities have not issued clear guidance to financial institutions resulting in weaknesses in the area of customer due diligence (CDD), beneficial ownership, record keeping, and reporting requirements. The GIABA mutual evaluation also points out to the lack of clarity on the powers of the financial intelligence unit (FIU) and inconsistencies pertaining to statistics on suspicious transaction reports (STRs) and currency transaction reports (CTRs).
A 2009 U.S. Department of State (DoS) report points out that Nigeria has made efforts to criminalize the financing of terrorism through Section 15 of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act (EFCC) Act, however, implementation of the existing framework is fraught with some challenges. Under the Act, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) has authority to identify, freeze, seize, and forfeit terrorist finance-related assets; however, the EFCC Act does not provide “a comprehensive framework for criminalizing and pursuing the full range of terrorist financing as defined by international standards,” the U.S. DoS report notes. The Act does not criminalize terrorist financing and does not reference terrorist financing as a predicate offence for money laundering. A bill for the prevention of terrorism, however, is currently before the National Assembly. A 2009 report by GIABA on Nigeria's progress since the 2008 mutual evaluation notes that "Nigeria has made significant efforts to address observations as well as implement recommendations raised in the MER [mutual evaluation report] since June 2008. The government is determined to attend to all outstanding issues with a view to building a robust AML/CFT regime in the country" (p. 5).
The Nigerian AML framework is governed by the 1995 Money Laundering Act which was amended in 2002 to broaden its scope to include proceeds from predicate offenses other than narcotics trafficking. However, in 2004, this Act was repealed and the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act was passed which covers the proceeds of all financial crimes. Other accompanying legislation include the 1991 Banking and Other Financial Institutions (BOFI) Act which, among other things, also empowers the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to freeze suspicious accounts. Furthermore, the 2004 EFCC Act led to the creation of the EFCC, the body that “investigates and prosecutes money laundering and other financial crimes, and coordinates information sharing,” notes the 2009 U.S. DoS report.
The Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU), established in 2005, is legally empowered under the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act of 2004 and the EFCC Act. It is housed within the EFCC, complementing the EFCC’s directorate of investigations. The NFIU does not carry out its own investigations and is responsible for receiving STRs and CTRs. The NFIU is a member of the Egmont group.
According to the details provided in the 2009 U.S. DoS report, beginning October 2007 through September 2008, the EFCC reported 3 money laundering convictions, with 9 pending cases against politically exposed persons and other pending cases related to fraud against U.S. entities. It also reported 87 “419” (term used to refer to the fraud section or Law 419 in the Nigerian Criminal Code) convictions during that period. The EFCC was also instrumental in the return of fraud proceeds to the tune of $1.6 million by a prominent Nigerian bank to U.S. entities. Despite these positive developments, the U.S. DoS report states that, in 2008 particularly, the EFCC faced serious challenges in fulfilling its mandate. For instance, the report points out that senior leadership changes (including the heads of both the EFCC and the NFIU) and the reassignment of key personnel have raised serious concerns about the agency’s current capacity and direction. The report adds that the new personnel reportedly have little experience in conducting the type of rigorous investigations required for complex financial crimes. Overall, the U.S. DoS conveys a sense of doubt with regard to Nigeria’s commitment to fight financial crime and corruption. Other than the EFCC and the NFIU, the remaining competent authorities in the area of AML include the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), and Special Control Unit against Money Laundering (SCUML).
The 2009 U.S. DoS report notes that Nigeria is a party to the 1988 United Nations (UN) Drug Convention, the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, and the UN Convention against Corruption. Furthermore, it has a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, which entered into force in January 2003. Nigeria also signed memoranda of understanding with Russia, Iran, India, Pakistan and Uganda to facilitate cooperation on issues relating narcotics trafficking and money laundering. Bilateral agreements for information exchange with respect to money laundering with South Africa, the United Kingdom, and all Commonwealth and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries have also been signed.
The Principles
NC1. Legal Systems and Related Institutional Measures
The 2008 GIABA assessment finds Nigeria “largely compliant” with recommendation (R) 1 and “partially compliant” with R 2, regarding the money laundering offense and its mental element and corporate liability, respectively. The report observes that predicate offense needs to be further defined and the current “all illegal acts or crimes” reference is too broad and general. As for R 2, the mutual evaluation notes that the “sanctions regimes are not proportionate and dissuasive” (p. 189). In its 2009 Progress Report, GIABA finds that Nigeria has yet to resolve the deficiencies identified with R 1 and R 2 by the 2008 mutual evaluation report (MER).
As the 2008 GIABA report indicates, Nigeria is “non compliant” with Special Recommendation (SR) II on the criminalization of terrorist financing. The report notes that the Nigerian legislation does not adequately criminalize terrorist financing and is not in line with international requirements. Furthermore, the law does not state that terrorist financing is a predicate offence for money laundering. The 2009 Progress report points out that this weakness has not been resolved yet and significant gaps remain in the law with respect to the scope of its implementation. However, a draft bill for the prevention of terrorism is currently before the National Assembly and the progress report notes that this flaw will be addressed when the new law comes into force.
With regard to R 3 on confiscation and provisional measures and SR III on the freezing and confiscation of terrorist assets, the GIABA finds Nigeria "partially compliant" and “non compliant” respectively. The assessment observes significant legal gaps in the country's confiscation regime. Among the numerous flaws listed, the GIABA observes that the “lack of definition of important concepts such as freezing, seizure, forfeiture and confiscation as well as inconsistency in the laws relating to freezing of assets makes the regime ambiguous” (p. 190). The 2009 Progress Report observes that this weakness has not yet been dealt with, however, some of the loopholes in this area will be addressed with the enactment of the Proceeds of Crime Bill. In addition, the passage of Prevention of Terrorism Bill will further strengthen some of the other aspects of this recommendation. With regard to poor coordination, the Progress Report notes that this flaw has been fixed with the setting up of the AML/CFT Inter Ministerial Committee. With regard to SR III, the report finds, among other things, that the EFCC provision on the freezing of terrorist funds and assets does not cover terrorist organizations and entities. Also, there is no mechanism in place for the enforcement of UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373. The GIABA also finds that there is an absence of a central authority for the implementation of terrorist financing related freezing and confiscation measures. These flaws, the 2009 Progress report notes will be addressed with the passage of the new prevention of terrorism bill.
The 2009 U.S. DoS Report notes that Nigeria established the NFIU within the EFCC in 2005 and that the agency draws its powers from the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act of 2004 and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act of 2004. In terms of the FIU and its functions, the 2008 GIABA report classifies Nigeria as “partially compliant” on R 26 and R 30 on resources, integrity and training. The GIABA finds Nigeria “partially compliant” with R 32 on statistics keeping as well. With regards to R 26, the GIABA report lists a number of weaknesses, namely, (1) the lack of clarity on the operational autonomy of the FIU; (2) the ambiguity with regard to powers of the directors under the EFCC; (3) no legal provision to ensure that the NFIU holds information securely; (4) the inconsistency of statistics on STRs and CTRs; and (5) the inadequacy of information in public reports issued by the FIU. However, per the 2009 Progress Report, these concerns and deficiencies have been addressed by the Nigerian authorities. For instance, the report points out that “the NFIU is guided by international best practices in the management of information at its disposal” (p. 28).
Nigeria is “largely compliant” with R 27 on law enforcement authorities and “compliant” with R 28 on the powers of competent authorities. On R 27, the GIABA finds that “the law does not clearly state whether the EFCC, Department of State Services (DSS) or the Attorney General is the proper authority responsible for prosecuting terrorist financing cases” (p. 197). However, this issue will be resolved with the passage of the prevention of terrorism act, the 2009 Progress Report notes. Also, specialized training is not available for Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) and judicial bodies. The Progress Report notes that in 2008, the AML/CFT training was extended to these bodies and therefore, the deficiencies mentioned in the 2008 GIABA assessment have been addressed. Finally, as noted in the GIABA’s assessment, Nigeria is “partially compliant” with SR IX on cross border declaration and disclosure due to multiple reasons. For instance, “the system does not specifically cover bearer negotiable instruments (BNI) or currency and BNI transported through containerized cargo or by mail,” (p. 204). However, these deficiencies have been resolved and per the 2009 Progress Report, “pursuant to sections 37, 71, 72 and 161 of the Customs Act, non-declaration of Bearer Negotiable Instruments on the prescribed Currency Declaration Form (CDF) is an offence” (p. 42).
II2. Preventive Measures - Financial Institutions
There were several concerns raised by the 2008 GIABA mutual evaluation especially in regards to the key requirements relating to this principle, namely, R 5 on CDD, R 10 on record keeping, and R 13 on STRs. However, a subsequent Progress Report in 2009 notes that all the deficiencies raised by the mutual evaluation in regards to these recommendations were addressed. The Progress Report, however, does not assign any compliance levels to these recommendations and therefore it is difficult to conclude if Nigeria is now compliant with the requirements of these principles.
According to the 2008 GIABA mutual evaluation, the preventive measures for financial institutions in the domestic sector fall short of addressing certain aspects of the customer due diligence requirements and, therefore, the country is assigned a non compliant rating on R 5. Most importantly, the assessment finds that “the requirement by law to conduct CDD is not extended to all of the situations required by the FATF Recommendations, particularly where doubts arise as to previously obtained CDD information for occasional transactions above USD 5,000 that are not cash, when there is a suspicion of terrorist financing, and for occasional transactions that are wire transfers” (p. 106). Other reason for non compliance cited in the report include: (1) law does not prohibit anonymous or numbered accounts; (2) limit on wire transfers exceeds the FATF threshold; (3) no clear obligation to identify and take reasonable measures to verify the beneficial owner; and (4) “Paragraph 9 of the KYCM [Know Your Customer Manual] allows for some full exemptions from CDD, rather than merely simplified or reduced due diligence” (p. 106). However, the 2009 Progress Report notes that these deficiencies have been addressed. For instance, the report points out that in March 2009, the CBN produced a new AML/CFT Compliance Manual which prohibits anonymous or accounts in fictitious names. The Manual addresses other deficiencies as well such as extending (by law) CDD requirements to all situations mandated by the FATF, conducting risk assessment, reporting requirements for wire transaction, identification and verification of beneficial owners etc. As of October 2009 the Nigerian authorities were revisiting the AML/CFT Manual and had released a draft version of the manual.
The mutual evaluation finds Nigeria “non compliant” with R 6 concerning politically exposed persons, explaining that there are no requirements on PEPs in Nigerian law. Also, there is an absence of a clear definition of PEPs. Per the 2009 Progress Report, this weakness has been addressed in the 2009 CBN AML/CFT Compliance Manual. The report finds Nigeria “non compliant” on R 7 on correspondent banking and R 8 on new technologies and non face-to-face business. With regard to R 7, the report finds that the law or regulation does not clearly define correspondent banking and there exists no guidance for financial institutions before establishing such a relationship. The Progress Report notes that this deficiency has been taken care of and correspondent banking is clearly defined in the CBN AML/CFT Compliance Manual. As for R 8, the GIABA observes that “the measures for mitigating risks in technology and for establishing non face-to-face businesses are not fully developed” (p 107). Per the 2009 Progress Report, this too has been addressed and guidance to mitigating risks has been provided to financial institutions in the CBN AML/CFT Compliance Manual.
According to the 2008 GIABA report, Nigeria is “partially compliant” with R 9 regarding third parties and introducers. The assessment explains that unlike FATF requirements, Nigeria does not prohibit the usage of third parties or intermediaries by financial institutions for obtaining and verifying customer information. However, the 2009 AML/CFT Manual addresses this deficiency. The evaluation finds Nigeria to be “compliant” with R 4 regarding financial institution secrecy or confidentiality and “partially compliant” with R 10 on record keeping. Other than concerns about certain sectors not meeting the record keeping standards, the report also observes that “the manner of preservation of information by some FIs [financial institutions] does not meet required industry standard” (p. 193). Per the 2009 Progress Report, the CBN Manual addresses these deficiencies. As for SR VII on wire transfer rules, Nigeria is rated “non compliant” as there exists no clear requirement in the law with respect to wire transfer. Per the 2009 Progress Report, the CBN AML/CFT Compliance Manual provides full guidance on wire transfers and all weaknesses observed in the GIABA assessment have been addressed.
The 2008 GIABA mutual evaluation rates Nigeria “largely compliant” with R 11 relating to the monitoring of unusual transactions and “non compliant” with R 21 pertaining to special attention for higher risk countries. However, the 2009 Progress Report notes that Nigerian authorities have addressed deficiencies pertaining both to R 11 and R 21. The report rates Nigeria “partially compliant” with R 13 relating to suspicious transaction reporting and R 14 on protection and no tipping-off. With regard to R 13, the GIABA explains that there exists limited STR reporting. Also, there is a lack of understanding of suspicious transaction by reporting entities and such transactions are not clearly defined in Nigeria. More recently, per the 2009 Progress Report, these deficiencies have been addressed and the “quality of STR has improved significantly” (p. 18). Also, the MLPA 2004 clearly defines suspicious transactions, the Progress Report notes. On R 19 regarding other forms of reporting, the GIABA assesses Nigeria as "largely compliant" and as “non compliant” with R 25 on guidelines and feedback as guidelines on the subject are inadequate. The 2009 Progress Report points out that the while the rating for R 19 remains unchanged, the deficiencies in R 25 have been addressed. Nigeria is given a “non compliant” rating with SR IV relating to suspicious transactions reporting for terrorist financing because there is no clear legal requirement for reporting terrorism financing or terrorist acts. Per the 2009 Progress Report, certain weaknesses in SR IV have been addressed. For instance, the AML/CFT Compliance Manual mandates that financial institutions render STRs relating to terrorist financing to the CBN and the NFIU. However, the report adds that other supervisory bodies have not yet issued any directives on terrorism financing and terrorist acts.
The 2008 GIABA evaluation finds Nigeria “partially compliant” with R 15 relating to internal controls, compliance and audit. According to the report, there are no specific provisions that enable the compliance officer to have timely access to related information. The deficiencies observed in R 15 have, however, been addressed per the 2009 Progress Report. On R 22 addressing foreign branches and subsidiaries, Nigeria is rated “non compliant” primarily because there are no requirements for insurance companies to ensure that foreign branches and subsidiaries apply AML/CFT measures. This issue has since been taken care of as the CBN Compliance Manual mandates that financial institutions inform the CBN on their inability to observe these requirements due to the host country. With regards to R 18 pertaining to shell banks Nigeria is rated "non compliant” as there are no legal requirements prohibiting establishment or operation of shell banks. However, more recently, the Progress Report notes that the CBN AML/CFT Compliance Manual prohibits operation of shell banks in Nigeria.
According to the 2008 GIABA report, Nigeria is classified “partially compliant” with R 17 regarding sanctions due to numerous reasons including inadequate compliance monitoring in certain sectors. As for R 23 relating to regulation, supervision and monitoring, Nigeria is rated “non compliant” as the number of “informal” currency exchange providers operating in an unregulated market is considerably high. Other reasons for the non-compliant rating include weaknesses in the supervisory programs and procedures of the CBN and SEC. However, in the Progress Report it is reported that all deficiencies with respect to R 23 have been addressed. The report notes that the CBN is developing an annual schedule/program to be executed by a special AML Unit to inspect financial institutions under its purview with respect to their AML/CFT practices. On R 29 with regards to its supervisors and R 30 on resources and integrity and training, Nigeria is rated “partially compliant.” The R 29 rating is assigned due to the low number of AML/CFT compliance inspections in certain sectors. With regards to both these recommendations the Progress Report observes that the weaknesses have been corrected. With respect to R 32 on Statistics, Nigeria is rated "partially compliant" as well. However, per the report the deficiencies have not been addressed so far. On SR VI covering AML requirements for money/value transfer services, the 2008 evaluation rates Nigeria “partially compliant” as “guidance on how to ensure compliance with the FATF standards for money or value transfer services is unclear,” (p. 203) the mutual evaluation notes. The 2009 Progress Report points out that all the weaknesses with respect to this principle have been addressed. For instance, the CBN AML/CFT Compliance Manual provides full guidance on money or value transfer services and the CBN enforces penalties and sanctions on financial institutions for breach of FATF requirements.
ID3. Preventive Measures - Designated non-Financial Business and Professions
According to the 2008 GIABA mutual evaluation, the Federal Ministry of Commerce (FMC) is the competent supervisory authority for Designated non-Financial Business and Professions (DNFBPs), which include casinos, dealers in jewelry, cars and luxury goods, chartered/professional accountants, audit firms, tax consultants, clearing and settlement companies, legal practitioners, supermarkets, hotel and hospitality industries, estate surveyors and valuers, precious stones and metals, trust and company service providers, pool betting, lottery, non-government organizations and non-profit organizations. With the enactment of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act of 2004, AML/CFT measures were introduced for DNFBPs as well. However, the 2008 GIABA mutual evaluation finds Nigeria “non compliant” with R 12 on CDD and record keeping obligations for DNFBPs. This rating was attributed to the lack of clarity on wider CDD obligations for DNFBPs. Also, the team observes casinos performing limited enhanced due diligence for higher risk customers. However, the Progress Report points out that these deficiencies have since been taken care of and “appreciable improvement has been recorded” (p. 17) in the understanding of CDD requirements.
Concerning R 16 on STRs related to DNFBPs, Nigeria is assessed “non compliant" for multiple reasons. For instance, the report notes that DNFBPs are not legally required to observe internal controls, appoint compliance officers or develop training programs. Also, at the time of the assessment weaknesses were observed in the effective supervision of DNFBPs in the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing. Lastly, the mutual evaluation notes that “there is no legislation explicitly protecting persons who report in good faith” (p. 194). The last deficiency is soon to be addressed by the proposed amendment of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, the 2009 Progress Report points out. The other weaknesses have also been addressed per the Progress Report.
Nigeria is “partially compliant” with R 20 concerning other Non-Financial Business and Professions (NFBPs) and secure transaction techniques since Nigeria has not implemented “modern secure transaction techniques” for such entities. This deficiency has since been addressed and the 2009 Progress Report notes that “Nigeria currently operates an e-payment system [under which] all payments for government businesses are done through the financial system” (p. 23).
On R 24 about DNFBP regulation, supervision, and monitoring, and R 25 on guidelines and feedback, the 2008 GIABA mutual evaluation rates Nigeria “partially compliant” and “non compliant” respectively. The evaluation attributes this R 24 rating to the lack of effective monitoring and enforcement of compliance with AML/CFT requirements for DNFBPs. As for R 25, the guidelines in place are limited and do not address certain essential FATF requirements. However, both these recommendations have since been fixed and all the deficiencies have been addressed. With respect to R 24 the Progress Report notes that “based on risk-based approach, SCUML has opened zonal offices in three geopolitical zones” (p. 26). As for R 25, the report points out that “all renditions are acknowledged while outcomes of STRs are sometimes communicated to the reporting entities as a way of feedback” (p. 28).
NC4. Legal Person and Arrangements & Non-Profit Organizations
The 2006 FATF report finds Iceland “largely compliant” with R 33 on legal persons – beneficial owners as “there are limited measures in place to ensure that there is adequate, accurate and timely information on the beneficial ownership and control of legal persons that can be obtained or accessed in a timely fashion by competent authorities” (p. 200). However, the 2009 Progress Report notes that this weakness has since been addressed as Section 94 of CAMA empowers public companies to require members to disclose information on beneficial owners. Also, the Corporate Affairs Commission has recommended an amendment to Section 94 so as to extend this provision for disclosure of information to private companies as well. As for R 34 on legal arrangements, the GIABA finds Nigeria “partially complaint” as the country does not have a comprehensive trust law. Also, there is an absence of guidelines with respect to management of trusts and beneficial owners. These issues have not been addressed per the Progress Report; however, efforts are being made to enact a trust law. Also, with regard to the FT Convention, the Anti Terrorism Bill is pending.
With regard to SR VIII on Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs) the GIABA rates Nigeria “non compliant” due to multiple reasons. For instance, the assessment points out that there is no monitoring, reporting or accounting mechanism in place and therefore, it is difficult to determine who has the controlling power over finance and administration of NPOs. None of these deficiencies have so far been addressed per the 2009 Progress Report.
NC5. National and International Co-operation
The 2009 U.S. DoS report notes that Nigeria is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, and the UN Convention against Corruption. Nigeria also signed memoranda of understanding with Russia, Iran, India, Pakistan and Uganda to facilitate cooperation on issues relating narcotics trafficking and money laundering. Bilateral agreements for information exchange with respect to money laundering with South Africa, the United Kingdom, and all Commonwealth and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries have also been signed. However, according to the 2008 GIABA report, Nigeria is rated only “partially compliant” on R 31 on national co-operation and coordination. The low ratings are attributed to several reasons including the lack of inter-agency cooperation. For instance, the mutual evaluation points out that the EFCC is often not willing to share information on intelligence with other agencies. However, these deficiencies have since been fixed, as the 2009 Progress Report notes the formation of National Inter Ministerial Committee on AML/CFT in July 2008 provides for enhanced cooperation between stakeholders and AML/CFT intelligence is widely shared. Nigeria is rated “partially compliant” with R 32 on statistics as well. Overall, with respect to R 32, the GIABA finds that statistics are not centrally coordinated and these deficiencies have not been addressed as noted in the 2009 Progress report.
On R 35 and SR I on the conventions and UN special resolutions, the GIABA evaluation finds Nigeria “partially compliant” and “non compliant” respectively. With regard to R 35 the report observes that the financing of terrorism convention had not been fully implemented and this deficiency has not yet been addressed per the 2009 Progress Report. As for SR I, the GIABA points out that “Section 15 of the EFCC Act which seeks to criminalize terrorist financing in Nigeria is not comprehensive and does not meet the requirements of 1999 FT Convention and FATF SR 1, and the UN Security Council Resolutions” (p. 201). Similar to R 35, the weaknesses in this recommendation will be addressed only after the passage of the Terrorism Act which is pending approval in the Nigerian parliament.
The 2008 GIABA mutual evaluation rates Nigeria “partially compliant” with R 37 on dual criminality as the Nigerian constitution and the legal framework does not allow for MLA request in all cases where dual criminality is required. However, the 2009 Progress Report claims that this issue has been addressed. The GIABA assessors find Nigeria “largely compliant” with R 39 and the less than compliant rating is explained by the fact that extradition cannot be applied to terrorist financing offences and per the Progress Report the rating remains unchanged as this deficiency has not been addressed yet. As for SR V on international cooperation, the evaluation finds Nigeria “non compliant” due to the lack of guidelines on terrorist financing cases. Again, this deficiency will be addressed with the passage of the Terrorism Act which is pending before parliament, the Progress Report notes. Finally in regards to the requirements for this principle, Nigeria is “largely compliant” with R 40 on other forms of cooperation since there is limited statistics and information on the types of international cooperation. This weakness has not be addressed yet.
